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Introduction  
 
In early 2019, an Indonesian couple detonated separate explosive devices inside a church in 
the southern Philippines, killing 23 people and wounding over 100 (Paddock & Gutierrez 
2019). The pair had been repatriated by the Turkish government in 2017, after failing to enter 
ISIS-controlled territory in Syria. On their return to Indonesia, they spent time in a 
 
1 Corresponding Author Contact: Cameron Sumpter, Email: iscsumpter@ntu.edu.sg, Nanyang Technological 
University, Block S4, Level B3, 50 Nanyang Avenue, Singapore 639798 
Abstract 
Evaluations aiming to assess the risk posed by individuals suspected or convicted 
of violent extremist activity have developed rapidly since the late 2000s. Largely 
based on a process known as structured professional judgement, terrorist risk 
assessments have drawn upon decades of research on those used for non-
ideological violent criminals, and inserted contemporary understandings of what 
may drive extremist violence. While uncertainty over precise risk factors presents 
ongoing challenges, the primary problem is that risk assessment instruments tend 
to be time consuming and complex, thus requiring a level of practitioner expertise 
not always readily available.  
Over the past several years, Indonesia has been experimenting with strategies to 
evaluate risk among individual extremist prisoners, but disagreements over 
suitability and human resource constraints have hindered progress. One way 
forward could be the establishment of a more simplified assessment system shared 
by relevant government stakeholders, from law enforcement to prison authorities 
to social service providers. While an abridged judgement process would hold 
limited capacity for prediction, a collaborative approach would add clarity and 
much needed inter-agency coordination to the management of convicted 
extremists in Indonesia. 
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government half-way house in Jakarta, as part of an ad hoc programme to help reintegrate 
waves of deportees who had met a similar fate (Santos 2019).  
Three years earlier, a former prisoner took part in a high-profile firearm and suicide 
bombing attack in central Jakarta, which left eight people dead including the four assailants 
(Schulze 2016). Later in 2016, another former inmate staged a botched attack on a church in 
the Indonesian Borneo city of Samarinda, which killed a toddler and injured three others as 
they played outside (Halim 2016). And in December 2014, a man considered to be a model 
inmate during his three-year sentence in an East Java prison attempted to travel to Syria to 
join ISIS, soon after his early release for good behaviour (IPAC 2015).  
Clearly, each of these accounts involves terrorism or violent endeavour from people 
who had recently been in state care or custody. While there can be no fool proof means for 
predicting an individual’s future behaviour, risk assessment instruments specifically intended 
for violent extremists have been designed and scrutinised over the past decade in a range of 
nations.  
For several years, relevant Indonesian government agencies have been searching for 
one that fits the nation’s context, needs and resources. Various players have emerged 
periodically with their own original tools or modified versions of pre-existing instruments, yet 
none has taken hold. During this period of relatively productive theoretical development in 
the field of risk assessments for violent extremists, why is an appropriate tool proving so 
difficult to implement? 
This article will discuss the reasons a workable system for assessing violent extremists 
in Indonesia remains elusive and offer a suggestion for progress. It argues that a simplified 
assessment process would bring value if it were a collaborative initiative among different 
government stakeholders. This would allow for varied input and, crucially, more streamlined 
coordination between the range of actors required to manage convicted extremists, from their 
initial arrest to eventual reintegration. For developers and donor organisations, the Indonesian 
experience represents a pertinent case study of the challenges involved when attempting to 
institute sustainable individual risk assessment procedures. 
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Methodology 
 
The present study focuses on a particular issue that emerged recurrently during four separate 
fieldwork trips conducted over the past four years in Indonesia. These research projects 
covered the broader topics of coordinating countering violent extremism (CVE) initiatives; 
and the management, rehabilitation and reintegration of both former prisoners convicted of 
terrorism offences and individuals repatriated after failing to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Each 
study was granted social, behavioural and educational research (SBER) ethics permission by 
the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore.  
Government officials were approached either through their agency’s international 
cooperation division or through the author’s research and media contacts in Jakarta. Civil 
society practitioners and researchers were identified by their publications or comments in the 
media, and then contacted online. Developing relationships within this community over the 
past several years led to engagement with additional people working on preventing and 
countering violent extremism in Indonesia (either as researchers or practitioners). Meetings 
were held in the interviewees’ offices or a location deemed more suitable. Individual input for 
this project is referenced in the text below. Two participants wished to remain anonymous 
given the sensitive nature of the issue. Secondary sources include journal articles, media 
reports, think-tank policy papers, and publicly available Indonesian government regulations. 
 
Evaluation Strategies, Risk Factors and Uncertain Indicators 
 
Individual risk assessment procedures have played at least some role in the United States 
criminal justice system since the 1920s, predominantly to inform parole decision processes, 
but later for other types of characterisation (Barabas et al 2018; Goel et al 2016). In the 1950s, 
an American clinical psychologist named Paul Meehl divided the various approaches to 
evaluating individual risk into clinical and actuarial models, a distinction which continues to 
pervade debates in the present day (Skeem & Monahan 2011). As the name suggests, clinical 
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assessments involve unstructured evaluations conducted by professionals considered experts 
in the type of risk involved in a given case. In practice, strictly clinical approaches have 
largely been limited to assessing psychiatric disorders and they are considered unsuitable for 
predicting crime or violent behaviour (Abbiati et al 2018).  
Actuarial methods, on the other hand, involve the statistical analysis of risk factors and 
relevant data, such as particular aspects of an individual’s criminal history. Today these non-
discretionary assessments may involve algorithms attempting to determine the likelihood of a 
person committing a crime – a calculation comparable to social media platforms crunching 
user data to predict shopping habits. Yet experts are sceptical accurate predictions can be 
made using only metrics and warn against reliance on the foresight of so-called big data 
(Barabas et al 17/7/19). To be sure, when it comes to violent extremism, the low base rate of 
violence and persistent uncertainty of risk factors make purely statistical approaches 
impossible to design (Monahan 2012; Sarma 2017).  
Consequently, researchers now agree that tools assessing the individual characteristics 
of people convicted or suspected of terrorist activity require a combination of metrics and 
‘clinical’ evaluation. Consensus has formed over a means known as Structured Professional 
Judgement (SPJ), which has been a favoured approach to assessing more general cases of 
violent crime for a number of years (Guy et al 2012; Monahan 2012; Dean & Pettet 2017; 
Logan & Lloyd 2018). This discretionary method requires the collection and analysis of data, 
and a subsequent qualitative evaluation conducted by a qualified interlocutor. Central to an 
SPJ assessment will be a series of questions regarding criteria determined by baseline studies 
and current research into the drivers of violent extremism, considering both push and pull 
factors. Supporting information may include, for example, court documents, behavioural 
observations, and known affiliations of the individual in question (Lloyd 2019).  
Two crucial features of the initial design process are establishing a risk assessment 
instrument’s specific objectives and its target population (Monahan 2011; Richards 2018; 
Sarma 2017). Certain tools have focused on assessing individuals deemed ‘vulnerable’ to 
radicalisation but have not committed any crime. Among prison populations, risk assessments 
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Six Prominent Risk Assessment Tools for Violent Extremists 
Extremism Risk Guidelines (ERG22+) – SPJ instrument created by forensic psychologists Monica Lloyd and 
Christopher Dean. Designed to assess inmates convicted of violent extremism offences or those who adopted such 
tendencies in UK prisons, in order to inform risk management. Involves 22+ risk factors and associated protective 
factors.  
RADAR – Based on Kate Barrelle’s pro-integration model (2015), this tool built for the Australian context has two 
stages: An initial screening interview determines the need for a second in-depth SPJ assessment involving 27 
indicators. Results are used to determine the most appropriate rehabilitation-type interventions. Applied to 
individuals considered ‘at-risk’ of radicalisation. 
Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18) – Developed by US forensic psychologist and FBI 
consultant J. Reid Meloy, to evaluate the risk posed by ‘persons of concern’ identified by security services and law 
enforcement (predominantly lone-actors). An SPJ instrument with two sets of indicators, including eight warning 
behaviours and ten distal characteristics.  
Violent Extremism Risk Assessment Version Two Revised (VERA-2R) – Updated version of an early 
instrument designed by Elaine Pressman and John Flockton. Intended for any and all violent extremists, in custody 
or before a crime is committed. Involves 34 primary and 11 additional indicators (including six protective) to be 
rated low, medium or high. Intended to inform security classification, rehabilitation initiatives, prison placement, 
and parole decisions.  
Islamic Radicalization (IR-46) – Devised by specialists within the Dutch National Police, the tool assesses risk 
posed by Islamist extremists at the time of evaluation (not a future prediction). Intended for use by specifically 
trained police and probation officers. Favoured because not overly complex and facilitates multiagency 
coordination for prevention. 
Multi-Level Guidelines (MLG Version 2) – An SPJ-based risk assessment for ‘group-based’ violence, which 
evolved from PhD research conducted by Alana Cook in Canada. Sixteen basic risk factors encompass four levels: 
individual, individual-group, group, and group-societal. Protective factors not directly included but assessors are 
encouraged to devise them for each particular case. 
(Lloyd 2019; van der Heide 2019; Pressman & Flockton 2012; RTI International 2018; Cook 2014; Barrelle 2015; 
Meloy 2018) 
are deployed to gauge an inmate’s likely behaviour within the institution, which can then 
determine placement, plans for potential rehabilitation programmes, and/or the likelihood an 
individual will reoffend upon release (recidivism). Research has established that different 
assessment designs are generally required for each specific purpose (Makarios & Latessa 
2013). Furthermore, variations should ideally extend to gender and age-group differences to 
account for potential diversity in motivation, outlook and institutional environment (Logan & 
Lloyd 2018). One benefit of SPJ assessments in this regard is they tend to be flexible enough 
to be modified and contextualised to the particular task at hand (Guy et al 2012). 
 
Box 1. Overview of Risk Assessment Tools 
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Once an assessment’s particular goals have been established, the instrument requires a 
set of criteria, ideally based on both risk factors (increasing the chance of violence/re-
engagement) and protective factors (diminishing these chances). One substantial problem 
when it comes to predicting terrorist recidivism is that driving forces and pathways to 
ideological violence are still very much contested (Scarcella et al 2016; Sageman 2017). 
Some argue the field of terrorism studies has largely agreed upon a number of robust, if 
disparate, evidence-based determinants (Pressman & Flockton 2012). Yet many of the 
strongest claims regarding ‘radicalisation’ are unhelpfully negative; for example, assertions 
that terrorists are not always economically underprivileged, nor are they uneducated, mentally 
ill, clinically suicidal or generally otherwise criminal (Monahan 2012: 179). Furthermore, 
individuals can internalise an extremist ideology without resorting to violence, while others 
may commit violence for a cause they don’t really care to understand (Borum 2015: 67). 
In a meticulous review of the literature on drivers of terrorism and support for 
extremist networks, Desmarais et al (2017) identified nine broad variables associated with 
terrorism, but stressed that no finding was sufficiently solid to be considered an empirically 
supported risk factor. While certain combinations of personal characteristics, experience and 
context may go some way to predicting the likelihood of membership in a terrorist 
organisation, the authors saw “much less evidence regarding factors associated with the 
perpetration of terrorist attacks” (Desmarais et al 2017: 199). Clemmow et al (2020) point out 
that shortcomings are largely due to a lack of risk and protective-factor base rates, and 
recently offered useful guidance on the formulation of control groups to bolster research 
design. Despite the deficiencies uncovered when zooming in on the literature to date, current 
assessment instruments employ a range of possible factors. 
Andrew Silke reviewed a number of active risk assessment approaches in 2014 and 
found that comprehensive models included between 17 and 31 different variables (2014: 113). 
Themes could be categorised into eight key areas: ideology, capability, political and social 
environment, affiliations, emotional factors, behaviour in custody, and disengagement factors 
(Silke 2014: 113-115). The only protective measure given was the last, albeit one with 
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possibly endless sub-categories. More recently, Monica Lloyd reviewed six of the major risk 
assessment frameworks used by practitioners today; half were designed for individuals 
convicted of terrorism offences and half deployed in the ‘pre-crime’ space. Each were found 
to differ in terms of the relative weight placed on a subject’s engagement with ideology, 
signals of violent intent, and capacity to commit a terrorist act, depending on an individual’s 
progression toward or away from their initial intention (Lloyd 2019: 6).  
This point about different stages of a given trajectory is important and complicates 
assessment design. As Randy Borum highlights, individuals “may pose different levels of risk 
for different roles/activities at different points in time”; risk factors may vary depending on an 
individual’s role in a violent extremist movement, and they may change their respective roles 
over time (2015: 64). Frequent behavioural observations, where possible, and the inclusion of 
secondary sources of data such as court documents, police reports and further background 
information can provide a more complete picture, which may mitigate these concerns. But 
ultimately, the predictive abilities of any risk assessment for violent extremism should not be 
overstated, particularly when attempting to measure the likelihood of recidivism (RTI 
International 2018; Borum 2015; van der Heide et al 2019). Instruments designed to inform 
prison placement, rehabilitation strategies and/or reintegration pathways may be more 
reliable. 
While risk assessments broadly following the structured professional judgement 
approach are now considered best practice, they require varied but generally high levels of 
expertise to administer. The qualitative nature of SPJ means there may be considerable 
subjectivity involved in evaluating answers, even to seemingly straightforward questions. 
Evaluators will be influenced by his or her personal background, gut feelings, and cognitive 
biases (Dean & Pettet 2016), and may well tend towards overly cautious assessments given 
the possible adverse consequences of false negatives (Richards 2018).  
Geoff Dean and Graeme Pettet argue this human subjectivity can be effectively 
“controlled in” to the process, however, as practitioners may draw upon their knowledge and 
professional experience to strengthen the assessment’s outcome (2016: 95). Conversely, if the 
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tool’s implementation is inadequate, results will be compromised, leading to ineffective 
correctional programmes and possibly flawed decisions (Flores et al 2006). Indeed, the use of 
some risk assessments for violent extremists, such as the ERG 22+, is restricted to forensic 
psychologists and highly trained probation officers (Scarcella et al 2016). In the Netherlands, 
parole officers were said to be initially positive about the introduction of the VERA-2R 
instrument, but eventually stopped using it due to “capacity issues and a lack of information” 
(van der Heide 2019: 20). Instruments may be robust and nuanced on paper, but ultimately, 
they are only effective if understood and wholly embraced by those tasked with conducting 
the assessment. 
One benefit of risk assessment tools for preventing violent extremism is the inherent 
multi-disciplinary nature of the associated processes. As mentioned, information can (and 
should) be contributed from different sources, including court documents, police investigation 
interviews, prison behaviour observations and practitioner interactions during rehabilitation-
type initiatives (Cornwall & Molenkamp 2018: 7). Some valuable input may be deemed too 
confidential to share with other agencies – particularly in countries where inter-institutional 
trust remains low. But the formulation of a workable risk assessment process may actually 
help to encourage greater coordination between stakeholders. Such incentive would be useful 
in Indonesia, which has arguably suffered from disjointed P/CVE policy and practice in recent 
years. While agencies involved in counterterrorism in Indonesia have experimented with 
different risk assessment strategies over the past decade, a unified approach is yet to be found. 
 
Indonesian Prisons: Extremists, Regulations and Assessments 
 
At the time of writing, there were 429 prisoners convicted of terrorism offences behind bars in 
Indonesia, with a further 175 suspected terrorists imprisoned on remand awaiting trial.2 While 
official data prior to the late 2000s is difficult to find, over one thousand individuals are 
thought to have been released after serving sentences for various terrorism convictions since 
 
2 Data provided to the author by Indonesia’s Directorate General of Corrections. 
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the first Bali bombing attack in 2002. On top of these figures, 200-300 Indonesian nationals 
have been forcibly repatriated by foreign governments since early 2017, mostly from Turkey 
after failing to enter ISIS-controlled territory, but also from nations in East and Southeast Asia 
due to concerns over extremist activity or engagement (Sumpter 2018). The majority of these 
‘deportees’ were placed in a one-month programme aimed at rehabilitating them before being 
reintegrated back into communities throughout the country (Anindya 2019). 
Risk and needs assessments for all prisoners are currently governed by regulation 
12/2013, which was issued by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights in 2013. Evaluations 
are intended to both establish the level of risk of reoffending among those seeking parole and 
to direct inmates into the most appropriate rehabilitation initiatives. Though in reality, such 
programmes depend more on institutional resources at a given prison facility than individual 
participant profiles. Trained prison and probation officers are responsible for conducting the 
assessments when prisoners first enter the correctional institution, and then once per year until 
the inmate is released on parole or after completion of his/her sentence (Kementerian Hukum 
dan Hak Asasi Manusia 2013). The regulation provides a general outline of the training 
assessors and supervisors require, which involves interviewing techniques and case 
management strategy. Data recorded during assessments form a dossier known at Penelitian 
Kemasyarakatan (LITMAS), which informs the majority of decisions regarding individual 
inmates throughout the system.3  
In 2018, a regulation (35/2018) issued by the Ministry aimed to revitalise the 
implementation of correctional processes and functions, including that of risk assessments. 
One goal was to improve the objectivity of evaluations attempting to gauge behavioural 
change, but the document does not expand on the assessor training stipulations from 
regulation 12/2013. The prison system’s detention service programme includes two tracks: 
one providing legal advice, and the other focusing on religious education, understanding 
national values, and (potentially) psychological counselling (Kementerian Hukum dan Hak 
Asasi Manusia 2018). LITMAS data is used to categorise inmates as low, medium or high 
 
3 Interview with Edward Pagar Alam, Head of International Partnership, Directorate General of Corrections, 
Jakarta, April 2018 
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risk, and then place them in one of four categories of facility: minimum, medium, maximum, 
and super-maximum security. Pursuant to recent reform, high risk prisoners are now placed in 
solitary cells but may be transferred to less constraining facilities following favourable 
assessment results and good behaviour.4  
A further regulation relevant to the management of prisoners in Indonesia is Reg. 
99/2012, which restricts access to remissions among serious offenders, including those 
convicted of terrorism offences, drug trafficking, corruption, transnational crime and gross 
human rights violations. Article 34 compels those serving sentences for terrorism charges to 
cooperate with law enforcement investigations, attend prison-based de-radicalisation 
programmes, and sign and read aloud a pledge of loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia (for 
citizens) or pledge never to repeat such acts (for foreigners) (Peraturan Pemerintah Republik 
Indonesia 99/2012). Following implementation, the regulation’s requirements quickly caused 
considerable resentment among all of the prisoners affected, which led to disturbances and 
even the occasional prison riot.5  
Among terrorist prisoners, 99/2012 also highlighted the distinction between what 
Jakarta-based experts have called the ‘pragmatists’, often followers of al-Qaeda linked groups 
who play along with authorities in prison to reap the benefits; and the ‘rejectionists’, who 
spurn most (if not all) attempts to engage (IPAC 2013: 8). In recent years, this latter category 
largely comprises supporters and followers of ISIS, and its associated networks in Indonesia, 
who now make up the vast majority of violent extremists in the Indonesian prison system.  
Despite cases in which extremist prisoners fool prison and security officials by 
displaying openness and good behaviour, some observers view Regulation 99 as a useful 
gauge to distinguish the most extreme from the more approachable. While this may well be a 
helpful stopgap, the regulation’s requirements also tend to exacerbate grievances and possibly 
shut down opportunities for potentially constructive piecemeal interactions. Many of the 
prisoners concerned may refuse to cooperate regardless, but when the regulation’s only 
 
4 Interview with Gatot Goei, Deputy Director, Centre for Detention Studies, Jakarta, October 2019 
5 Interview with Adhi Kustiadi, former UNICRI consultant, Jakarta, April 2018 
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tangible benefit appears to be assessing individual risk, perhaps there could be a less divisive 
way to determine remission applications and encourage assistance with investigations.   
 
Security and Law Enforcement Assessments 
 
Indonesia’s national counterterrorism agency, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme 
(BNPT), was established in its current form in 2010, following devastating suicide bombings 
at two upmarket Jakarta hotels in 2009, and a subsequent jihadi threat to assassinate then 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Glendinning & Weaver 2009). The agency’s 
prevention deputy published its Deradicalisation Blueprint in 2013, which laid out a broad 
approach to reforming convicted extremists in prison and following release. The first step of 
the four-stage process was called Identification, which intended to collect data on the 
individual in question and assess his or her level of extremism (BNPT 2013: 39). Over the 
past few years, BNPT has run programmes with convicted extremists, separate to the more 
general treatment services delivered by prison authorities. The Identification assessments 
ostensibly inform these BNPT initiatives, and sometimes transfer recommendations regarding 
certain prisoners, but evaluation findings are not directly shared with prison authorities.  
The other major counterterrorism agency in Indonesia is an elite unit of the National 
Police called Special Detachment 88 (Densus 88). Set up in the years following the first Bali 
bombing attack in 2002, Densus soon developed into a highly effective operational force in 
the nation’s struggle against an often ragtag yet persistent militant jihadi movement (Allard & 
Kapoor 2016). While the unit is primarily tasked with disrupting plots and dismantling 
terrorist networks, Densus 88 personnel also conduct prison visits to maintain contact with 
those willing to engage and observe dynamics among those who continue to refuse 
interaction. When certain prisoners convicted of terrorism offences are due for release, a 
Densus officer conducts an exit interview to estimate the risk of their reoffending and inform 
the level of need regarding resource-intensive post-release monitoring.6 It is not clear what 
 
6 Interview with Densus 88 officer, Jakarta, April 2018 
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types of questions are asked, but the session involves roughly 24 pages and takes 4-5 hours to 
complete. This data is also considered too sensitive to share with other state agencies such as 
probation services. 
 
An Incomplete Puzzle 
 
Beyond state institutions, a range of foreign and domestic stakeholders have offered 
contributions to the formation and/or progression of risk assessment instruments in Indonesia. 
An early candidate was Corrective Services New South Wales (CSNSW), the prison authority 
of Australia’s most populous state. Following a successful visit by Indonesian prison officials 
to Australian correctional institutions in 2008, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFAT) organised for two CSNSW senior staff to consult with counterparts in 
Jakarta to help build capacity throughout the Indonesian prison system (Bonnett 2011).7 A 
key priority was to develop systems to identify prisoners considered at high risk of 
reoffending, which included data collection through interview techniques, prison intelligence 
strategies, and the recognition of risk assessment concepts (Cox et al 2012; Bonnett 2011).  
By 2011, the partnership began to consider risk assessments aimed at extremist 
inmates, more specifically. As mentioned, the VERA(-2) instrument was created in Canada by 
Dr Elaine Pressman in collaboration with Australian psychologist John Flockton, who is 
clinical director and senior specialist at CSNSW. Flockton visited Indonesia in March 2011 to 
help implement VERA-2 and to train prison, police and intelligence officers to administer the 
SPJ assessment (Flockton 2011). However, the project eventually began to disintegrate and 
ended up collapsing “for a variety of reasons” (IPAC 2014: 16).  
According to a senior DGC official interviewed in 2016, the VERA-2 instrument, 
which had allegedly been adapted to fit local conditions, was still not considered suitable for 
the Indonesian context, and assessors “did not know if the prisoner was actually improving or 
 
7 Another stream of this initiative was the provision of funds to the Asia Foundation, which helped the 
Directorate General of Corrections (DGC) establish a blueprint for prison reform, and the development of an 
online database on prisoners, which has streamlined the prison system’s workflow (Cox et al 2012).  
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just pretending to become a better person. VERA could not make this distinction”.8 Civil 
society practitioners knowledgeable of the experiment say the instrument was deemed too 
complicated for the modest resources available.9 The original authors of VERA-2, who own 
the copyright, allegedly offered to simplify the tool and provide training.10 However, 
Indonesian prison officials maintain that a lack of training and capacity building contributed 
to the programme’s demise.11 
The next prominent pursuit came from a small Jakarta-based team from the United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Institute (UNICRI). In 2014, attempts were made to 
establish a modified risk assessment instrument for violent extremist prisoners in Indonesia, 
but again the project wallowed in the pilot stage. UNICRI representatives struggled to secure 
buy-in from Indonesia’s corrections directorate, who again thought the tool was not suitable 
for the Indonesian context. From 2016, a newly appointed UNICRI consultant sought to start 
afresh – this time focusing on a Grand Design and Road Map for the management of high risk 
prisoners, including but not limited to violent extremists (UNICRI 2018: 41). A risk 
assessment was built into this framework by adding questions and criteria to the pre-existing 
LITMAS tool, which was easier for DGC officials to accept. Ultimately, prison and probation 
officers have only employed these additions on an ad hoc basis to bolster their general 
assessments, if and when they see fit.12  
Non-governmental organisations working on prevention initiatives, Indonesian 
research institutes and academics have also worked towards data collection and tools for 
assessing individual risk among violent extremists. The Indonesia chapter of the US-based 
organisation Search for Common Ground signed an agreement with DGC in 2010 and began 
conducting workshop-type programmes in prisons involving themes such as conflict 
management (SFCG 2011). Common Ground staff attempted to develop profiles of prisoners 
 
8 Interview with senior DGC official, Jakarta, September 2016.  
9 Interview with Adhi Kustiadi, former UNICRI consultant, Jakarta, April 2018 
10 Interview with civil society practitioner, Jakarta, September 2016 
11 Interview with Edward Pagar Alam, Head of International Partnership, Directorate General of Corrections, 
Jakarta, April 2018 
12 Interview with Edward Pagar Alam, Head of International Partnership, Directorate General of Corrections, 
Jakarta, April 2018 
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but eventually ran into problems from state security agencies, possibly due to suspicions 
regarding the activities and/or intentions of foreign-linked organisations.13  
Indonesian NGO Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian (YPP) has attempted similar 
initiatives in recent years, while working to build capacity among prison and parole staff. In 
2014, YPP proposed a system whereby certain prisoners would be given personal progress 
books containing various indicators, which prison officers would help them fill in 
periodically.14 However, the scheme never took hold.  Another tool developed by the 
Indonesia Strategic Policy Institute (ISPI) involved 20 questions aimed at determining a 
prisoner’s ideological commitment and level of support for violence (IPAC 2016: 17). 
Inmates convicted of terrorism offences are spread throughout roughly 100 different prisons 
in Indonesia. While some of these assessment experiments may have been trialled or even 
continued in some form at certain facilities, depending on the warden, none has so far 
managed to convince executive level officials they could or should be standardised or further 
developed. 
 
Pre-release Programmes and Repatriation Engagements 
 
One risk assessment instrument that has been operationalised over the past two years was 
developed by psychologists at the University of Indonesia (UI). In early 2017, BNPT opened 
a facility near its headquarters (south of Jakarta) to accommodate cooperative prisoners 
convicted of terrorism offences who are nearing the end of their sentence, or due for parole. 
The idea was to place inmates in closer proximity to BNPT staff to facilitate more frequent 
engagements, separate them from negative influence, and prepare them for life on the outside 
(IPAC 2016: 18). While the centre suffered from growing pains, mainly due to a dearth of 
facilities and activities (IPAC 2018: 4), an interesting experimental course run by UI 
psychology scholars Mirra Noor Milla and Hamdi Muluk focuses on eliciting individual 
identities (as opposed to group identification) and evoking feelings of self-worth. Selection 
 
13 Interview with civil society practitioner, Jakarta, September 2016 
14 Interview with Taufik Andrie, Director, Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian, Jakarta, April 2018 
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for this ‘deradicalisation finishing school’ is based on a risk assessment developed by the two 
psychologists during previous work in the broader prison population. Inmates complete 
information about themselves based on eight variables. This is then followed by an interview 
and a triangulation of information with data from Densus 88 and prison LITMAS files.15  
The only comparable risk assessments currently employed outside the prison system in 
Indonesia are for the individuals who have been forcibly repatriated by foreign governments 
for involvement in violent extremist activity or support. During the 30-day rehabilitation 
period, residents interact with social workers and psychologists, and attend seminars run by 
BNPT aimed (ambitiously) at deradicalisation, or tempering their hard-line views (Anindya 
2019). At least three different risk assessments have reportedly been used. One from BNPT, 
the contents of which are unclear; one from ISPI, which was adapted from its prison model; 
and a third developed by an organisation called Civil Society Against Violent Extremism (C-
SAVE).16  
The C-SAVE instrument, which was still under development at the time of writing, 
involves an interview comprising 12 primary questions, conducted by a clinical psychologist, 
and behavioural observations of day-to-day activities in the shelter. The goal is to place 
individuals into one of four categories: ideologues (thought leaders/influencers); militants 
(strategists/recruiters); supporters (who may provide operational assistance); and 
sympathisers. Each are also deemed low, medium or high risk – a general division which 
appears to be one of the few constants among the myriad risk instruments having emerged in 
recent years. C-SAVE’s assessments provide information for ongoing work conducted by 
social workers, whom the organisation is training to engage with potential/suspected/former 
violent extremists.17 
 
 
 
15 Interview with Mirra Noor Milla, Associate Professor, Universitas Indonesia, October 2019 
16 Interview with Diovio Alfath, Programme Officer, Civil Society Against Violent Extremism (C-SAVE), 
Jakarta, October 2019 
17 Ibid. 
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Headway or history repeating? 
 
In 2017, the small UNICRI team in Jakarta lost its funding stream, and its work on high-risk 
prisoners and assessments was taken up by a local institute called the Centre for Detention 
Studies (CDS). Supported by the Asia Foundation and the Australia-Indonesia Partnership for 
Justice (AIPJ), CDS signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Indonesia’s corrections 
directorate (DGC) in 2018.18 While still in its late stages of development, The CDS strategy 
concerning prisoners convicted of terrorism offences consists of three products: an initial 
screening instrument for prison placement; an evaluation process based on prison guard 
observations; and a comprehensive criminogenic risk assessment approach, which aims to 
individually tailor rehabilitation programmes more effectively and support decisions 
regarding parole and remissions.19 
In accordance with the 2018 ‘revitalization’ regulation issued by the Ministry of Law 
and Human Rights, which clarified inmate placement based on risk, CDS redeveloped an 
assessment tool first conceptualised by a consultant at UNICRI. Four risk variables attempt to 
determine the likelihood of attempted escape; the risk of violence toward fellow inmates; the 
chance of violating prison rules or ignoring orders; and the possibility of a prisoner continuing 
his or her criminal activities from behind bars, or attempting to prejudice investigations 
(Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia 2019). The assessment also takes into account 
the crime committed by the inmate, their length of sentence, and the extent to which a 
prisoner has conformed with rehabilitation initiatives.  
More specifically for high-risk prisoners, and particularly for those convicted of 
terrorism offences, the CDS team has developed a system for evaluating behaviour based on 
prison officer observations. The scheme has been on trial for about a year in high security 
facilities on the prison island of Nusakambangan off the south coast of Java.20 Comprising a 
 
18 Interview with Gatot Goei, Deputy Director, Centre for Detention Studies, Jakarta, October 2019 
19 Ibid. 
20 Sometimes referred to as Indonesia’s ‘Alcatraz’, Nusakambangan was developed as a penal island under 
Dutch colonial rule in the early 20th Century.  
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checklist with a number of different indicators, prison officers reportedly used the instrument 
for a period of time before abandoning the system, again, for a variety of reasons.21 Some 
appear to have considered the evaluation overly impersonal and mechanical, forcing them to 
treat inmates as scientific subjects and undermining their ability to connect on a human 
level.22 The observation checklists are also nether obligatory nor incentivised, so expecting 
modestly paid prison officers to substantially increase their daily work load with an 
administrative task may be ambitious. 
The most extensive tool currently in the works is another specific risk assessment 
process for prisoners convicted of terrorism offences, which is intended to bolster individual 
LITMAS files. A Ministry of Law and Human Rights decree issued in early 2019 stated the 
latest system developed by CDS researchers would be employed to identify appropriate types 
of reform interventions, and attempt to determine the likelihood an individual prisoner would 
reoffend post release (Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia 2019). The process 
ideally involves a variety of input, from court documents, police interrogation reports, data 
from other relevant agencies, and interviews with relatives; to the observation evaluations 
outlined above, results from a separate ‘self-identification’ test, and an intensive interview 
conducted by correctional officers, or consultant psychologists.23 This interview involves five 
factors: conceptions of violence and its legitimacy in religious teachings; the extent to which 
an extremist ideology has been internalised; the involvement of family members in the 
extremist movement; attitude toward the crime committed and any associated victims; and 
feelings toward the Republic of Indonesia (Kementerian Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia 
2019). 
The ministerial decree includes detailed standard operating procedures for 
implementing the assessment interview, including the required equipment and resources, and 
the likely duration of the process. The interview itself is expected to take two hours; but when 
considering input, analysis, and the recommended period of familiarising each prisoner with 
 
21 Interview with the Centre for Detention Studies, Jakarta, October 2019 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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the process so they agree to participate, the total duration is over five hours. CDS staff have 
conducted two-day training sessions with prison officers in high security facilities on 
Nusakambangan island and returned 2-3 months later to evaluate understanding and provide 
further training where necessary.24 The first day of training was held in a classroom 
environment, taking officers through the criminogenic factors, associated concepts and input 
methods, while the second day involved role plays and practical exercises with cooperative 
prisoners.  
This latest attempt at establishing a robust assessment for convicted extremists is well 
researched by Indonesian analysts with local knowledge of the relevant dynamics, both within 
the prison system and among the nation’s homegrown extremists. But while the initiative 
appears to have buy-in from the corrections authority, which has issued a decree outlining the 
intended approach, the only way the assessment process will be actually established is if it is 
used keenly and consistently by prison and probation officers tasked with its implementation. 
It remains unclear if this time-consuming evaluation will be embraced. Recollection of past 
efforts does not inspire much confidence. 
 
Conclusion 
 
As with many programmes and initiatives aimed at preventing violent extremism, risk 
assessments are multidisciplinary, resource intensive and relatively complex, but plagued with 
uncertain outcomes. It is difficult to invest heavily in a project with unavoidable cracks, 
which exist among even the most sophisticated systems delivered by clinical psychologists 
and experts in the field. The problem in Indonesia has not been a lack of viable options over 
the years, but rather the final few yards that see a particular instrument agreed upon, 
implemented and institutionalised. Some NGO observers in Jakarta argue that few of the 
emerging instruments have been properly tested, and that senior prison officials (some of 
whom may view their position as a career steppingstone) are not sufficiently invested in long-
 
24 Ibid. 
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term solutions. Conversely, prison officials committed to their under-resourced (and arguably 
under-appreciated) government department believe the problem is largely one of capacity, and 
that sustained training programmes are required to establish any sophisticated new method.  
Roughly ten per cent of those convicted of terrorism in Indonesia over the past 15 
years have reoffended following release, which seems high but is actually substantially lower 
than global recidivism rates among general prison populations – currently estimated at 
between 26 and 60 per cent (Yukhnenko et al 2019). In December 2019, Indonesian prisons 
were accommodating over 268,000 prisoners, which is double what they’re designed to 
hold.25 Reforms in recent years have updated administrative processes (including that which 
makes inmate numbers publicly available), added technology and improved the management 
of high-risk prisoners. Yet the Indonesian prison system is still grappling with tremendous 
problems, from dilapidating infrastructure and over capacity to human resource shortfalls and 
stubborn corruption. Complicated, fallible evaluations of its few hundred troublesome violent 
extremists may not be high on the list of priorities.  
The latest version has placed emphasis on using findings to inform prison-based 
rehabilitation initiatives based on particular need, which must be seen as promising. However, 
existing programmes are likely insufficient to meet the identified requirements. BNPT have 
taken the lead with de-radicalisation efforts over the past five or so years, presumably based 
on their own identification assessments, at least in theory. However, the agency has tended to 
operate independently of the corrections directorate in this regard, bringing in consultants 
deemed to be effective interlocutors for particular individuals. Data collected on prisoners 
convicted of terrorism is understandably sensitive, but while protecting it from misuse by 
other agencies may well be required in certain circumstances, sharing information with 
counterparts within the government system to work towards collective solutions is surely a 
greater goal. 
A risk assessment for violent extremists in Indonesia would be hindered by suboptimal 
coordination in Indonesia, but the right instrument may also encourage its development. If a 
 
25 See Sistem Database Pemasyarakatan, available at http://smslap.ditjenpas.go.id/public/grl/current/monthly 
(accessed 21/12/19) 
  
 
 
 
 
Cameron Sumpter: Realising Violent Extremist Risk Assessments in Indonesia 
 
 
 
 
116 
Spring 2020 
Nr. 22 
ISSN: 2363-9849          
standardised assessment protocol was established with various stakeholders contributing 
relevant information, it could provide a strong basis for ongoing collaboration between police, 
security services, prison authorities, parole officers and social service providers. Certain 
details in an individual’s file could be redacted where necessary, but a single evolving 
document on each individual in question could be used by different stakeholders as decisions 
are made from prosecution to post-release reintegration programmes. Key will be finding an 
effective but relatively straightforward approach. Instead of continually experimenting with 
modified versions of complex assessments developed overseas, it may be more productive to 
acknowledge human resource limitations and proceed with a simplified assessment aimed to 
be shared appropriately among government agencies. 
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